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We're engaged in a long struggle against violent extremists that seek to exploit any seams in our armor. Our job -the (U.S. Northern Command) team's job -is to mend
those seams, to strengthen the shield. General Gene Renuart, Commander, U.S. Northern Command; March 23, 2007 As General Renuart assumed command of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in March 2007, he recognized significant seams or gaps remain in the U.S.
Government's (USG) ability to defend against and respond to terrorist attacks and catastrophic incidents. In recent memory, the results of both the 2005 hurricane season and Top Officials Three (TOPOFF 3), the nation's largest domestic terrorism response exercise that same year, were sobering reminders that the USG has much to learn about coordinating effective and efficient domestic response operations. 1 Though the National Response Plan The Department of Defense (DOD) strongly advocates unity of effort and coordinated action in their myriad joint publications and doctrine; however, DOD has yet to achieve these overarching objectives when working across interagency lines in the domestic realm. While integration has improved somewhat at the tactical level, DOD Combatant Commanders have been reluctant to fully integrate with USG agencies during catastrophic events at the operational level. Discounting both Presidential and Deputy Secretary of Defense directives, DOD leaders have chosen to conduct business as usual, creating a separate parallel command structure that results in inefficient response operations and duplication of effort. 2 This division between DOD and the multi-agency USG command and control structure at the operational level is an unnecessary and dangerous seam that should be mended by Combatant
Commanders who are called upon to conduct Civil Support (CS) and Homeland Security (HS) missions. 3 This paper will examine the evolution of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the NRP and DOD's role in domestic response operations; review select lessons learned from major disaster response operations, National Special Security Events (NSSE), and national exercises; and provide recommendations to fully integrate DOD forces into domestic response operations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the nation's management of homeland security operations and catastrophic events.
Evolution of the National Incident Management System
In December 2004, the NRP replaced multiple disparate federal response plans with one integrated national plan that required all agencies to use a single National Incident Management System. 4 The advantages of a Unified Command using ICS include a single incident organization with a common set of response objectives that promote unity of effort. ICS requires a modular and scalable organization; strict adherence to span-of-control limits; common terminology, organizational elements and position titles; and a systematic planning process that leads to a single, multi-agency Incident Action Plan. 12 Information management flow and coordination are greatly improved when all response organizations are represented in a single, unified command.
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At the operational level, the Joint Field Office (JFO), a multi-agency coordination center, is organized around the NIMS organizational structure into management, operations, planning, logistics and finance/administration sections (See Figure 1) . A sixth section to manage intelligence and information may be added to support mission objectives. This structure aligns with the ICS organizational structure at the tactical level, the Incident Command Post. 
Catastrophe is the Catalyst for Change
In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act reworked the command structure of the United States military. The goal of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to fix problems caused by inter-service parochialism, insularity and rivalries that had led to the catastrophic failure of the Iranian hostage rescue in 1980 and the inefficient Grenada invasion in 1983. 17 In effect, the goal was to fully establish unity of effort by requiring integrated command structures and joint military planning, logistics and operations. As a result, the term "jointness" was born.
In the 1990s, a comparable divide among domestic emergency response agencies culminated in a similar national call to unify during response operations. Prior to publication consisted of more than ten disparate major information collection and command and control centers dispersed throughout New York City. 19 Of note, the DOD JTF operated relatively independently of the other federal agencies. 20 In addition to being geographically separated, hindering efficiency of operations and unity of effort, the multiple command posts were not linked by a single information management system. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Information Network had been tested earlier in 2004 at the Democratic National Convention; however, many local, State and Federal agencies, including DOD, had yet to gain access to or were not capable of using the system. 21 As a result, the command and control and information management diagram looked like a spider web. Had a terrorist incident occurred, the disparate command centers would have been hard-pressed to coordinate an effective response.
In April response scenario, and participants failed to achieve the desired goal of creating a realistic common operating picture for senior officials.
The true test of the USG's ability to meet the requirements of the new NRP occurred in late-August 2005 with the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. Because the NRP calls for the same command and control construct during all incidents of national significance, many of the lessons learned from this event can be applied to future catastrophic response operations.
As with the RNC and TOPOFF 3, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned found that disparate information management systems and command and control constructs resulted in "an often inconsistent and inaccurate operating picture of the disaster area for the senior decision-makers, duplication of efforts, gaps in addressing requests for assistance, and the inefficient allocation of resources." 22 In regards to DOD integration, the report found that "a fragmented deployment system and lack of an integrated command structure for both active duty and National Guard forces exacerbated communications and coordination issues during the initial response." NORTHCOM established Joint Task Force Katrina to coordinate military operations; however, the JTF did not integrate with the interagency JFO. Additionally, a lack of coordination between the JTF Katrina Commander and the JFO during the early stages of the response delayed critical response efforts. In late-2006, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act expanded the term "joint matters" to include the interagency community. The legislation specified that, in addition to all DOD services, "joint" operations should now include other departments and agencies of the United States and non-governmental organizations involved in "strategic planning and contingency planning" and "command and control operations under a unified command." 26 As DOD leaders failed to fully achieve both Presidential and Deputy Secretary of Defense calls for USG unification, Congress provided yet another impetus for military cultural change by tying funding to a vision of unity of action. Like the Goldwater-Nichols Act twenty years earlier, the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act creates an opportunity to address past failures to achieve true USG unity of effort.
Recommendations and Analysis
The following recommendations and analysis provide a methodology for DOD leaders to fully integrate into domestic response operations and align with the intent of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act. In addition to a lack of integration at the operational level, DOD and domestic responders do not speak the same language. While domestic responders are required to use the Incident Command System planning process, DOD has not adopted the nationally mandated system and chooses to continue to use the Joint Operational Planning Execution System (JOPES). 30 For example, the JFO produces Incident Action Plans and Coordination
JTF and JFO
Plans using the NIMS ICS planning process, while DOD produces planning products, such as operations orders, using JOPES. Though it has been argued DOD's "canonical" planning model may not prove effective during rapidly-paced terrorist response scenarios in a multiagency environment, it is a system that it is fully entrenched in DOD, has proven effective in multiple operations and will likely not be altered. 31 In reality, the NIMS and JOPES planning processes are not that different; both have common elements and functions. The solution is to align these operational crisis action planning processes as shown in Table II By aligning these processes through an integrated command structure, crisis action planning and "joint" operations can be synchronized to enhance unity of effort. Additionally, alignment will create an economy of effort in the planning processes and produce a more accurate common operational picture. While DOD operations will benefit from improvements to crisis action planning and achievement of the desired common operating picture, civilian planners will also benefit from experiencing the regimented military decision-making process and working with experienced operational planners. This symbiotic relationship will enhance national domestic response and homeland security operations and contingency plans. Ideally, these officers will attend the same courses and exercises, and earn the same national qualifications as interagency emergency responders. Second, and more difficult to achieve, is the need for a change within the DOD culture. DOD members working in domestic response operations must recognize and value the contributions of the interagency community. Like the cultural shift that occurred in the twenty years following the Katrina is that "we must transform our approach for catastrophic incidents from one of bureaucratic coordination to proactive unified command that creates true unity of effort." NORTHCOM and PACOM could designate their Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) personnel as an IMT based on the USFS and USCG models. The SJFHQ organization, comprised of 58 operational planners, command and control specialists and systems analysts, is relatively simple and readily aligns with the JFO construct. 41 The SJFHQ is composed of six groups: command, information superiority, plans, operations, knowledge management, and logistics (See Figure 2) . 42 These SJFHQs could train with USFS and USCG IMTs to benchmark best practices and improve national domestic response capabilities. This IMT could then integrate into the JFO immediately upon notification of a catastrophic incident to facilitate civil-military operations within a single, unified command and achieve the goals of the NRP, NIMS and NSS. Table III 44 This is an opportunity for DOD leaders to join and help build an IMT from the ground up. Once established, the national interagency IMT should train, exercise and respond together to improve unity of effort and continuously enhance the nation's response capabilities.
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A Unified National Information Management System: A national, unified information management system should be developed to align multi-agency reporting requirements and create a single common operational picture. While DOD promotes the concepts of network-centric warfare for expeditionary forces, the homeland security team operates with multiple disparate information networks. 46 The bottom line is that each State, the National Guard, DOD, and DHS, plus multiple other domestic response agencies, all use different information management systems. As a result, information cannot be effectively shared during time-critical response operations and scarce resources are expended to accomplish redundant reporting requirements. As discussed earlier, this lack of situational awareness is magnified by the fact that the DOD and other federal agencies are separated physically and culturally. Ultimately, lost time, lost information and crossed signals during domestic response operations cost lives and further threaten the nation's safety.
In an attempt to improve interagency communications, DHS created the Homeland Security Information Network. However, according to the DHS Inspector General, the system was "put together too quickly" to ensure it meets information protection standards, specifically for sensitive and classified intelligence and law enforcement information. 47 As a result, DOD, FBI, and others are reluctant to use the system. Operational security (OPSEC)
is not only a significant issue for DOD. The law enforcement community and many other federal agencies must also maintain OPSEC for mission success. This issue, however,
should not be used as a roadblock to integration and unity of effort. Exercises, such as Military strategist Milan Vego notes "interoperability is achieved by developing and applying joint doctrine…." 53 By legislative direction, the concept of "joint" now includes all U.S. agencies in addition to the DOD services. Hopefully, this will serve as an impetus to move forward with more integrated and inclusive joint doctrine.
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Conclusion
The Global War on Terrorism is being fought on two fronts. While the media and fiscal focus is on the overseas efforts, the home front receives comparatively little attention. 
